[FOM] FOM BUFFALO LOGIC COLLOQUIUM 4TH SUMMER NOTICE

[John Corcoran]

BUFFALO LOGIC COLLOQUIUM 
http://www.philosophy.buffalo.edu/EVENTS/blc.htm
2006-7 THIRTY-SEVENTH YEAR
FOURTH SUMMER ANNOUNCEMENT
QUOTE OF THE MONTH:  THE TASK OF FORMAL LOGIC: KEYNES AND ARISTOTLE: The
function of the formal logician is to distinguish between that which is
self-consistent and that which is self-contradictory. J. N. Keynes
1884/1906, 215.  Aristotle's view was that the function of the formal
logician is to distinguish between what is implied by and what is
independent of (not implied by) a given premise set. In a way, Keynes
and Aristotle agree. In order for a conclusion to be implied by a given
premise set it is necessary and sufficient for the negation of the
conclusion to be inconsistent with the premise set. In order for a
conclusion to be independent of a given premise set it is necessary and
sufficient for the negation of the conclusion to be consistent with the
premise set.- Frango Nabrasa 2006. 


SIXTH MEETING
Wednesday, August 16, 2006	12:00-1:30 P.M.	141 Park Hall

SPEAKER: Thomas Bittner, Departments of Geography and Philosophy,
University of Buffalo.
MODERATOR: Leonard Jacuzzo, Philosophy, Fredonia State University and
Canisius College.
TITLE: A theory of granular parthood based on qualitative cardinality
and size measures.
ABSTRACT: We present a theory of granular parthood based on qualitative
cardinality and size measures. Using standard mereological relations and
qualitative, context-dependent relations such as 'negligible in size
with respect to' and 'large in cardinality', we define a granular
parthood relation and distinguish different ways in which a collection
of smaller objects may sum to a larger object. At one extreme, an object
x may be a mereological sum of a large collection p of objects where the
members of p all negligible in size with respect to x (e.g. x is a human
body and p is the collection of its molecules). At the other extreme, x
may be a mereological sum of a collection q of non-overlapping objects
none of which are negligible in size with respect to x (e.g. x is again
a human body and p is the collection consisting of its head, neck,
torso, and limbs). Obviously, we cannot give precise quantitative
definitions for relations such as 'negligible in size with respect to'
or 'large in cardinality' since these are, even within a fixed context,
vague relations. The primary focus in the formal theory presented in
this paper is on the context-independent logical properties of these
sorts of qualitative cardinality and size relations and their
interaction with mereological relations. In developing our formal
theory, we draw upon work on order of magnitude reasoning.

SEVENTH MEETING
Wednesday, August 23, 2006	12:00-1:30 P.M.	141 Park Hall

SPEAKER: Maureen Donnelly, Departments of Geography and Philosophy,
University of Buffalo.
MODERATOR: James McNabb, Chair of Humanities, Erie Community College.
TITLE: Distinct Summation Relations for Different Kinds of Stuff.
ABSTRACT: It is sometimes claimed that every portion of stuff is a
mereological sum of its sub-portions. For example, the gold in your ring
is, on this view, a mereological sum of its sub-portions of gold (the
portions of gold that are part of it). In his paper "Some Stuffs are not
Sums of Stuff" (The Philosophical Review, Jan 2004), David Barnett
argues that certain kinds of stuffs are not sums of their sub-portions.
A portion of crude oil can gain and lose sub-portions of crude oil and
thus, according to Barnett, is not a sum of its sub-portions of crude
oil. In this paper, we develop a time-dependent mereology in which
several different summation relations are introduced. We show that the
portion of gold and the portion of crude oil are both sums of their
sub-portions, but they are different types of sums of their
sub-portions. More generally, we show how by introducing a wide variety
of parthood and summation relations in our mereology, we can make
interesting distinctions between the mereological properties of i)
integral objects, ii) homogenous unstructured stuffs (e.g., portions of
gold) and iii) mixtures (e.g., portions of crude oil). 



Future Speakers: William Demopoulos (University of Western Ontario and
UC-Irvine), David Hitchcock (McMaster University), Daniel Merrill
(Oberlin College), Mauro Nasti di Vincentis (University of Salerno),
William Rapaport (University of Buffalo),  Stewart Shapiro (Ohio State
University), Barry Smith (University of Buffalo), Kevin Tracy
(Washington and Lee University).

THE 2006 SERIES OF BROWN-BAG MEETINGS WILL CONCLUDE WITH THE SEVENTH
MEETING.  COME WHEN YOU ARE FREE.  BRING LUNCH.  LEAVE WHEN YOU HAVE TO.
ALL ARE WELCOME.

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