[FOM] Self-reference in natual, languages (re >>this sentence, cannot be proven true<<)"
A.P. Hazen
a.hazen at philosophy.unimelb.edu.au
Thu Aug 10 06:13:49 EDT 2006
Quine's elegant recipe for self-referential sentences uses the construction
(*) appended to its own quotation yields an F
(where F is to be replaced by some noun phrase: e.g. "falsehood"),
and he claims that appending a phrase of this form to its own
quotation produces a sentence naturally interpreted as saying of
itself that it is an F. If I understand Hartley Slater, one of his
objections to this is that (*) contains a dangling (antecedentless)
pronoun, "its." But surely THIS objection can be overcome with a
minor reformulation:
(**) is a string of words which, when appended to its own
quotation, yields an F.
This seems like a perfectly grammatical English VP (VP: "verb
phrase," something which can be, in the jargon of older grammars, the
"predicate" of a simple declarative sentence), and the only pronouns
in it HAVE antecedents: "its" is anaphoric for "which" which in tun
has the NP "a string of words" as antecedent.
Question for Haim Gaifman: does this version have a direct
translation into Hebrew?
Historical note: Gödel's double-substitution trick for obtaining
self-referential sentences, whgich Quine imitates in English, seems
to have been anticipated by Russell: cf. Judy Pelham & Alasdair
Urquhart, "Russellian propositions,"in D. Prawitz et. al., eds.,
"Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science IX"
(Elsevier-Horth-Holland, 1994), pp. 307-326. Nice illustrative
applications, including the definition of a formal language
equivalent to First-Order Logic in which sentences have the
subject-followed-by-predicate form exploited by Quine, can be found
in Raymond Smullyan, "Languages in which self-reference is possible,"
JSL 22 (1957), pp. 55-67.
--
Allen Hazen
Philosophy Department
University of Melbourne
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