FOM: RE: A Puzzle

[Cristian Cocos]

> We can place any suitable collection of names in a one-one 
> correspondence. For example
> 
> Clemens, Poe, Twain
> Austen, Bronte, Carlyle
> 
> What is the guarantee that the things they name have the same 
> number?  In this case there is no such, the first series 
> naming two authors, the other, three.

The fact that Clemens and Twain name the same thing (author) is, again,
an empirical fact, something that has nothing to do with set theory. Set
theory is NOT supposed to account for such facts, hence both these sets
have the same number (3) as far as set theory goes. No guarantees are
*needed* then.

Cristian Cocos
UWO